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In the light of the recent global crisis the disputes related to the pro-cyclicality of banks’ loan 
loss provisioning behaviour became one of the widely discussed topics in existing research. The 
core idea of the problem states that banks create fewer provisions during good times while 
during bad times provisioning level significantly increases which leads to the decline of lending 
in the economy at the same time as the country desperately needs credit from the banks.  
Previous empirical research documented cases of pro-cyclical bank provisioning behaviour. In 
this research loan loss provisions of CIS banks have been examined for the presence of pro-
cyclicality. Following the outcomes of existing research we have tested three hypotheses: the 
pro-cyclicality hypothesis, income smoothing and capital management hypotheses. Based on the 
sample of 64 commercial banks from Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine which have the most 
advanced banking systems among CIS countries the results indicate confirmation of pro-cyclical 
loan loss provisioning behaviour. However our empirical results have revealed signs of counter-
cyclicality in provisioning systems of CIS banks, because the Russian regulation for standard 
loans from homogenous group and Ukraine for all standard loans obliges banks to create general 
loan loss provisions. However we have not documented income smoothing among CIS banks 
and test results have shown that loan loss provision changes fail to relate to the changes of 
earnings before taxes and provisions. Capital management hypothesis has been confirmed 
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The main negative result from bank’s pro-cyclical behaviour is a reduction in lending during 
downturns which reinforces the momentum of underlying economic cycles’ (Gonzales, 2009, 
p.1). According to Beatty and Liao (2009), the reasons for the pro-cyclicality of bank lending 
can be capital market imperfections, capital regulation and pro-cyclicality of loan loss 
provisioning.  The latter reason has been a widely discussed topic in recent empirical research.  
Discussions started from the hypothesis that capital regulation has an impact on the pro-
cyclicality of the countries’ economies. (Laeven & Majnoni, 2003). This implies that during 
economic downturns banks experience a deterioration of the quality of assets which leads to a 
contraction of capital and a worsening of the capital ratio.  Consequently in terms of the limited 
access to capital markets banks have to decrease lending in order to comply with capital 
regulations (Bikker & Metzemakers, 2005). In a recession the country’s economy is sensitive to 
the lower volume of credit therefore ultimately the fact of a decline in lending leads to a further 
worsening of the macroeconomic situation. Some researchers conclude that loan loss provisions 
also play a role in the creation of the economy’s pro-cyclicality because of the interrelation 
between provisioning and capital and therefore the business cycle. (Laeven & Majnoni, 2003; 
Bikker&Metzemakers, 2005, Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008).   
The main observation to emerge from research is that banks tend to increase loan loss provisions 
during the economy’s downturns and decrease the provisions during upturns (Laeven & 
Majnoni, 2003, Bikker&Metzemakers, 2005, Bouvatier&Lepetit, 2008). Since the creation of 
loan loss provisions relates to the decrease of the banks retained earnings, which are one of the 
sources of capital growth, bank capital declines as soon as provisions increase. Therefore when 
banks are faced with the danger of the capital ratio’s violation they start to decrease their lending 
level.  Such provisioning behaviour is considered as pro-cyclical because ultimately during bad 
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times it results in shrinkage of the bank’s lending and becomes the reason for further 
deterioration of the countries macroeconomic situation.     
However other research reveals counter-cyclical provision behaviour (de Lis et al, 2001)  or even 
a combination of both counter-cyclical and pro-cyclical provisioning (Galindo & Rojas-Suarez, 
2011). The most notable evidence of counter-cyclical provisioning behaviour is the experience of 
the Spanish banks. Spain implemented special regulations for the loan loss provisions and in this 
way left less opportunities for discretional actions by the bank managers in creation of loan loss 
provisions.  According to the regulation Spanish banks must create more provisions during good 
times to be used during bad times and in this way lessen the pressure on the banks profitability 
and therefore on its capital. 
This paper aims to test the loan loss provisioning behaviour of CIS banks. The CIS banking 
sector is relatively young compared with mature USA or European banking systems which have 
largely been the focus of recent research (Laeven & Majnoni,2003; Bikker&Metzemakers, 2005; 
Bouvatier&Lepetit,2008; Kanagaretnam et al,2003). Only 20 years have passed since the 
creation of the CIS following the collapse of the USSR. In this period CIS nations had to 
undergo a transition from a command to a market economy and started to implement 
international standards concerning the conduct of business and the economic environment at a 
rapid pace. Therefore we believe that our research could be helpful in understanding loan loss 
provisioning behaviour in young emerging markets such as among the countries of the CIS and 
we will be able to highlight the extent to which the predictions of empirical studies are supported 
in the case of CIS banks.   
Most existing research examining the relations between bank provisions and pro-cyclicality tests 
three hypotheses: the first hypothesis, that provisions have a pro-cyclical effect on the country’s 
economy; the second, the income-smoothing hypothesis and the third, the capital management 
hypothesis. The present study will test the above hypotheses with reference to CIS countries. The 
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pro-cyclicality hypothesis is the central issue of our paper since we intend to discover whether 
CIS bank loan loss provisioning behaviour is related to a worsening of the macroeconomic 
situation during downturns in the countries under consideration. Income-smoothing and capital 
management are two divergent bank actions by their impact on the pro-cyclicality of loan loss 
provisions. Income-smoothing to some extent mitigates (Bikker&Metzemakers, 2005) while 
capital management strengthens the pro-cyclical effect of the loan loss provisioning behavior 
(Bouvatier&Lepetit,2008). As far as we are aware there has been no research conducted on the 
bank provisioning behavior of CIS banks. The following research is based on a sample of sixty 
four commercial CIS banks. Countries such as Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine noted as the 
countries with the most developed banking system of the CIS countries and form a sound sample 
of the CIS banking system. 
The research uses regression analysis and tests the model consisting of bank-related and macro-
economical variables which have been used by previous empirical research (Laeven & Majnoni, 
2003, Bikker&Metzemakers, 2005, Bouvatier&Lepetit, 2008). However taking into account 
peculiarities of banking system and the economic environment of the CIS region the model 
employs additional independent variable which we believe has an impact on the provisioning 
behavior of the CIS banks. The structure of this paper is as follows. Chapter 1 is devoted to the 
theory and literature review. Chapter 2 makes reviews the economic situation of each of the 
countries under consideration. Chapter 3 describes the data and the model used for regression 
analysis. Chapter 4 contains the empirical results of our research and our conclusions.  
Chapter 1: Theory and literature review. 
In order to mitigate the negative impact of possible crises banks create ‘two shock absorbers: 
loan loss reserves and capital’ (Laeven&Majnoni, 2003, p.195). Loan loss reserves according to 
Laeven&Majnoni (2003) aim to cover expected losses while unexpected losses, which are less 
predictive and infrequent, should be covered by the bank’s capital.  Loan loss reserves are 
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formed through the loan loss provisions and are included in the asset side of the bank’s balance 
sheet. Increase of loan loss reserves accumulates through loan loss provisions while write-offs 
decrease the size of reserves. Loan loss provisions are created by means of the bank’s income 
and are therefore considered as an expense.(UPLIFT, 2001)  Loan loss provisions consist of two 
categories: general provisions which form a part of the bank’s capital and specific loan loss 
provisions (Laeven&Majnoni, 2003). Specific provisions are also called ‘ex-post’ provisions 
since they are created if loans have overdue repayments. General provisions are created for the 
entire loan portfolio and are considered as ‘ex-ante’ provisions because they cover future 
possible losses.  General loan loss provisions are included in Tier 2 capital and formed from after 
tax earnings. (Laeven & Majnoni, 2003).    
In the light of crises experienced by the world over several decades the connection between bank 
provisioning and pro-cyclicality of the countries’ economies has become a widely discussed 
topic in recent research. Empirical research devoted to this theme found evidences of both pro-
cyclical and counter-cyclical provisioning behavior of the banks since each country follows its 
own provisioning policy.  
In order to determine whether bank provisioning contributes to the pro-cyclical process in 
countries’ economies, research mainly tests three hypotheses: the pro-cyclicality hypothesis tests 
relationships between loan loss provisions and business cycle and two other hypotheses:  capital 
management, which contributes to the problem of pro-cyclicality and the income smoothing 
hypothesis, which, on the contrary, smoothes pro-cyclicality of provisioning behavior (Laeven & 
Majnoni, 2003, Bikker&Metzemakers, 2005, Bouvatier&Lepetit, 2008). 
1.1.Pro-cyclicality hypothesis 
According to Gonzales (2009) bank’s pro-cyclical provisioning behavior means that during 
boom periods banks decrease the level of provisioning and expand their lending while during 
downturns they act in the opposite way.  Such bank behavior ‘reinforces the momentum of 
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underlying economic cycles’ (Gonzales, 2009, p.1).  However the theory of counter-cyclicality is 
based on the idea that credit risk is accumulated by banks during economic upswings and 
therefore should be recognized and covered by the appropriate provisioning level in order to 
create a buffer for bad times. (Bikker&Metzemakers, 2005) Dynamic provisioning policy 
implemented in Spain is a vivid example of counter-cyclical provisioning behavior (de Lis et al, 
2001). Therefore in order to confirm or reject the pro-cyclicality hypothesis most studies test 
correlation of loan loss provisions and business cycles represented mainly by macroeconomic 
data. Empirical research largely finds two reasons of pro-cyclical provisioning behavior of 
banks. They are capital regulation and accounting standards.       
As has been previously mentioned, the provisioning system closely relates to the bank’s capital. 
According to Cavallo & Majnoni (2001) their interrelation can lead to pro-cyclicality problems 
in the economy, namely when loan loss provisions do not cover expected losses during economic 
downturns, capital should compensate both expected and unexpected losses. In such cases banks 
are faced with the consequences of inadequate provisioning levels which leads to a significant 
shrinkage of capital. Since capital increase can be expensive during recession, banks start to 
control their compliance with capital regulation in order to avoid capital ratio violation. 
Ultimately banks reduce the volume of lending which in its turn further deteriorates the 
macroeconomic situation in the country. Cavallo & Majnoni (2001) suggest that elaboration of 
provisioning regulation as a part of capital regulation can be a method of overcoming the 
problem of provisioning pro-cyclicality since  ‘a capital regulation without sound provisioning 
rules may have pro-cyclical effects’ (Cavallo & Majnoni , 2001, p 2).  
Sood (2011) conducted his research on the basis of US banks between 2001 and 2009 and finds 
evidence of pro-cyclical provisioning behavior. He argues that pro-cyclicality of loan loss 
provisions is caused by the peculiarity of the US accounting system which does not allow the 
creation of provisions for future losses. This approach is based on a backward looking 
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provisioning model which recognizes losses post facto. As a result at the moment of economic 
downturn banks create more provisions due to the loan portfolio’s depleted quality therefore 
decreasing the bank’s capital. Eventually banks have to shrink their lending to comply with 
capital regulation.  Sood (2011) argues that the dynamic provisioning model is able to solve the 
problem of pro-cyclicality because it implies that creation of loan loss provisions should be 
positively correlated with the loan growth or in other words, the provisioning level should be 
increased during economic upturns in order to create a buffer for the bad times. 
The research of Fillat & Montoriol-Garriga (2010) is based on US bank data. It supports Sood’s 
(2011) and Cavallo & Majnoni’s (2001) studies since they agree that pro-cyclicality of 
provisioning, is embedded in the capital regulation and accounting standards. As it has been 
widely discussed in recent research, the dynamic provisioning model is able to solve the problem 
of pro-cyclicality. However,  Fillat & Montoriol-Garriga (2010) come to the conclusion that if 
US banks implemented dynamic provisioning systems it would not prevent them from the 
negative consequences they experienced during the recent crisis. Their main idea is that 
‘effectiveness of dynamic provisioning depends on severity’ of the shock that the country’s 
economy faces during downturns (Fillat & Montoriol-Garriga, 2010, p.12).     
  Laeven & Majnoni (2003) test the hypothesis of inadequate loan loss provisioning among a 
large sample of banks from different countries and find confirmation of pro-cyclicality in their 
provisioning behavior since  banks show a tendency to increase (decrease) provisions when 
lending levels and GDP growth declines (go up). However they document the income smoothing 
hypothesis which in its turn mitigates pro-cyclical provisioning behavior.   
Bikker & Metzemakers (2005) also document the evidence of pro-cyclical effect of provisions 
among banks from OECD countries. However they find confirmation of the income smoothing 
hypothesis and positive relationships between the loans growth and loan loss provisions which 
have counter-cyclical effects on bank provisioning behavior. Bouvatier & Lepetit’s (2008) 
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research shows the macroeconomic influences on the pro-cyclical provisioning behavior of 
banks from OECD countries. Worsening of economic conditions in the country leads to a 
worsening of the borrower’s ability to repay loans and therefore increases the number of bad 
loans. In such situations banks start to create more provisions in order to be able to cover their 
losses and reduce their lending.   
Counter-cyclical provisioning systems or dynamic provisions have been adopted by Spain in 
2000 (de Lis et al, 2001). According to de Lis et al (2001) Spanish banks, apart from general and 
specific provisions, must create the third category of provisions for covering expected losses.  
Statistical provisions act as a buffer fund and therefore negatively correlated with specific 
provisions for compensation of ex-post credit risk. This means that during downturns when 
specific provisions increase, statistical provisions decline since they are used to smooth earnings. 
Statistical provisions are defined as the difference between ‘latent global losses’ and specific 
provisions (de Lis et al, 2001, p.13).  Moreover Spain elaborated detailed provisioning 
regulations aimed at excluding all possible manipulations with provisions by bank managers.     
Galindo & Rojas-Suarez (2011) surveyed seven Latin American countries and confirmed that 
some countries such as Peru, Uruguay and Bolivia adopted dynamic provisioning models while 
others including Colombia combine elements of both counter- and pro-cyclical models .     
1.2. Capital management hypothesis. 
As per Zhou Yunxia, (2007) the necessity of balancing capital regulation and the cost of capital 
gives stimulus for banks to use capital management. The aim of capital for any bank is to cover 
unexpected losses. However because of capital costs there is a possibility that banks will not 
hold enough capital to cover losses. Such bank behavior increases the risk of bank’s insolvency 
which eventually can have negative consequences for the whole society. That is why bank 
regulations implemented a capital adequacy ratio: the higher ratio the better. Banks are required 
to be above the fixed minimum level of the ratio otherwise they receive sanctions for violation of 
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
14 
 
rules. Violation of capital regulation is a costly event for any bank which stimulates bank 
managers to apply for capital management. (Zhou Yunxia, 2007)   
According to Bouvatier & Lepetit (2008), capital management relates to discretionary action. 
Capital ratio is the ratio of total capital to total assets. Capital management can be performed 
through the changes of ratio’s nominator since any manipulation with the denominator is an 
expensive and difficult procedure. (Zhou Yunxia, 2007). Bouvatier & Lepetit (2008), explain 
that, as a rule, total capital consists of Tier1 and Tier 2 capitals.  Tier 1 capital combines equity 
and retained earnings. Specific provisions reduce retained earnings and therefore the creation of 
provisions leads to shrinkage of capital and worsening of the capital ratio. If increase of specific 
provisions is made during an economic recession, entry into capital markets, as a rule, can be too 
expensive for banks. Therefore the option of issuance of additional shares is not the appropriate 
way-out.   However taking into account that general provisions are included in Tier 2 capital 
banks can improve the capital ratio by increasing general provisions (Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008; 
Bikker&Metzemakers, 2005).  Overall such discretionary actions do not decrease the risk of 
banks’ insolvency and is therefore called capital management.( Bouvatier&Lepetit, 2007) 
The confirmation of the capital management hypothesis differs due to the fact that different 
models and methods were used. However capital management is mainly confirmed if there is a 
negative correlation between the independent variable, capital ratio with nominator consisting 
from sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capitals less general loan loss provisions and the dependent 
variable, loan loss provisioning, which hereinafter is considered as the sum of specific and 
general provisions. The negative sign of the independent variable’s coefficient implies that when 
capital ratio decreases banks tend to increase their general provisions and vice versa (Zhou 
Yunxia, 2007). In addition capital management is documented in the case of a positive 
correlation between Tier 1 capital ratio and loan loss provisions meaning that low capital levels 
leads banks to decrease provisions(Zhou Yunxia, 2007).  
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Bikker & Metzemakers’ (2005) research confirms the capital management hypothesis for a 
sample of banks from 29 OECD countries. However they do not exclude the fact that negative 
correlation between loan loss provisioning and capital ratio can be a result not only of capital 
management but also a consequence of the poor quality of loan portfolios which leads banks to 
create more provisions. It is worth mentioning that Bikker & Metzemakers (2005), separate loan 
loss provisions and loan loss reserves using them as dependent variables in two different models. 
Their results conclude that the relationship between loan loss provisions and capital ratio for 
their sample contributes to the confirmation of capital management hypothesis more than the 
relationship between loan loss reserves and capital ratio. From their point of view this is because 
provisions are more related to managerial decisions than loan loss reserves.        
Kim & Kross (1998), investigate whether changes made in capital regulation after 1989 
influenced bank managers’ decisions to manipulate capital ratio. They find that excluding loan 
loss reserves from primary capital used as regulatory capital before 1989 and including them in 
Tier 2 capital after 1989 stimulated poorly capitalized banks to decrease loan loss provisions in 
order to increase Tier 1 capital and therefore improve capital ratio. For well capitalized banks 
they do not find significant differences before and after the capital regulation changes.     
Bouvatier & Lepetit (2008), find that banks with low levels of capital tend to decrease loan loss 
provisions, which is evidence of using capital management among European banks in the period 
1992-2004 therefore after the implication of changes in capital regulation. In this sense their 
results are similar to those of Kim & Kross (1998).   
Ghafar Ismail & Tan Be Lay (2007), confirm the capital management hypothesis for Malaysian 
banks. Increase of loan loss provisions decreases retained earnings and therefore decrease Tier 1 
capital, however in this way banks are still able to increase Tier 2 capital since general 
provisions constitute an element of Tier 2 capital. This means that Malaysian banks use general 
provisions to improve capital adequacy ratio. However such tactics work if general loan loss 
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provisions are not more than 1. 25% of risk-weighted assets, otherwise the result of manipulation 
with loan loss reserves can be opposite to that expected. 
Zhou Yunxia, (2007), find that Tier 1 capital and loan loss provisions are positively correlated 
meaning that banks with low Tier 1 capital tend to decrease loan loss provisions. This result 
corresponds to the results of Kim & Kross (1998), and Bouvatier & Lepetit (2008), in spite of the 
different methods used for testing the hypothesis. Zhou Yunxia (2007) also confirms a negative 
relationship between loan loss provisions and Tier 2 capital meaning that the banks in their 
sample are using capital management. This evidence is consistent with Ghafar Ismail & Tan Be 
Lay’s, (2007) conclusions. 
Perez et al (2008) fail to find confirmation of the capital management hypothesis for Spanish 
banks. They draw attention to the fact that bank’s incentives to manipulate with provisions in 
order to comply with capital ratio in most cases depends on the accounting base and capital 
regulation of each country. In 2000 Spain implemented new capital regulation which excluded 
general loan loss provisions from regulatory capital. In many countries specific loan loss 
provisions are created on the basis of loans classification (WB, 2003). Classification of loans in 
turn is in most cases discretional procedures that therefore leaves opportunity for manipulation. 
In Spain the majority of loan classifications and the creation of both specific and general 
provisions are strictly determined by the regulation preventing attempts for capital management.  
Spain implemented dynamic statistical provisioning which implies the creation of more 
provisions during upturns and using accumulated funds during downturns.     
1.3. Income smoothing hypothesis.  
Bouvatier & Lepetit (2008) consider income smoothing as another discretionary action. The 
main idea of income smoothing is that bank managers use loan loss provisions to hide the real 
volatility of bank earnings in a way which is beneficial for them. The negative side of this tactic 
is underestimation of loan loss provisions which do not cover expected losses in a proper way. 
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The positive effect is that overall it follows almost the same pattern as dynamic provisioning 
system, namely banks create more provisions during boom times while decreasing provisioning 
levels during downturns therefore decreasing the cyclicality of provisions.   
Kanagaretnam et al (2003) document income smoothing among US banks during the period from 
1987 to 2000. They also empirically confirm that ‘job security concerns’ the demand of external 
financing and peculiarity of regulation influence the bank mangers’ incentives to smooth 
earnings.   The first reason for income smoothing relates to the concerns of managers over their 
jobs due to weak performances of banks during the bad times which caused them to decrease 
provisions during recession or, in other words, to borrow funds from the future good times and 
decrease provisions when the crisis passes. All in all such managers report smooth profitability. 
The second reason lies in the willingness of banks to borrow external funds at lower prices since 
less volatility in bank earnings signals good bank performance to investors and therefore less 
risky investments.  The third reason relates to the bank regulation which treats banks differently 
depending on the level of their capitalization. For example, well-capitalized banks are inspected 
less frequently than adequately capitalized banks therefore they have incentives to smooth 
earnings. In addition to the already mentioned reasons Laeven & Majnoni (2003), name tax 
incentives meaning that the creation of loan loss provisions leads to a fall in taxable income 
therefore increasing the bank’s tax savings. Laeven & Majnoni (2003) with reference to Goel 
and Thakor (2002) argue that income smoothing also diminishes the desire of investors to obtain 
private information and therefore decreases shareholder losses. Overall their research confirms 
the existence of income smoothing in their large sample consisting of banks from developed and 
emerging countries. Bikker & Metzemakers (2005) and Ghafar Ismail & Tan Be Lay (2007) 
confirm income smoothing for banks from 29 OECD countries and for Malaysian banks 
respectively. Bhat (1996), emphasized that banks with weak financial performance tend to 
smooth their earnings.  
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Bouvatier & Lepetit (2008), do not in general find evidence of income smoothing since their 
results show that banks do not increase their provisions when earnings before taxes and 
provisions increase. However for banks with good performance they document signs of income 
smoothing which contradicts to the findings of Bhat (1996). Ahmed et al’s (1999) research 
differs from other reviewed papers by their attempt to define whether relationships between 
earnings and provisioning have changed since new capital regulation were implemented in 1990. 
According to their hypothesis new regulations which excluded loan loss provisions from the 
primary capital should decrease the cost of manipulation with provisions for earning 
management. The main idea is that in terms of new capital regulation banks could benefit from 
income smoothing without violation of capital adequacy that is greater than prior to its 
implementation.  For example decrease of provisions can lead to increase of Tier 1 capital and 
decrease of Tier 2 capital if the size of the bank’s loan loss reserves does not exceed the allowed 
upper bound of reserves while under the old regime decrease of provisions would lead to a 
worsening of the capital ratio. However Ahmed et al (1999) did not find evidence of income 
smoothing in their sample during both old and new regimes of capital regulation.  
Perez et al (2008) researched data from Spanish banks for the period from 1986 to 2002. Spain in 
2000 implemented a new dynamic provisioning system which uses almost the same mechanism 
as income smoothing. The main difference is that dynamic provisioning is a prescriptive action 
regulated by the rules while income smoothing is discretionary and therefore considered as 
manipulation by the management. Perez et al (2008) argue that statistical provisioning is a 
‘transparent smoothing device’ (Perez et al, 2008, p.427). Nevertheless they find confirmation of 
income smoothing for Spanish banks. However additional tests show that sensitivity of 
provisions to net operating income becomes less after 2000.  Zhou Yunxia (2007) confirms the 
hypothesis of income smoothing in their sample. He discovers a positive correlation between 
provisions and earnings which implies that banks decrease loan loss provisions when the earning 
level is low and vice versa. In addition Zhou Yunxia (2007) finds that if banks with a similar 
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level of Tier 2 capital have negative earnings growth in comparison with the previous period, 
they tend to decrease provisioning for increase of earnings rather than to increase provisions in 
order to improve capital ratio through Tier 2 capital.     
1.4. Literature review: provisioning behavior of CIS banks. 
To the best of my knowledge no academic papers have been devoted solely to the testing of the 
above mentioned hypothesis on CIS banks. However we can conclude from the existing articles 
related to the banking systems of Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine that concerns about pro-
cyclical banks behavior exists and has been considered by the related authorities. 
Hsieh et al’s (2008) research is based on a number of countries. They note that Russia is among 
countries where general loan loss provisions are part of Tier 2 capital and the compulsory level 
of loan loss provisions are fixed by regulations for the standard loans. These two factors Hsieh et 
al (2008) relate to the income smoothing hypothesis. Their empirical evidence suggests that 
countries with regulation systems which determine a minimum level of provisions for standard 
loans demonstrate a confirmation of the income smoothing hypothesis and their provisions relate 
less to the business cycle than in the countries which do not have such regulation. However 
Russian banks were not included in the sample due to the lack of observable data. Barisitz 
&Lahnsteiner (2010) point out that loan classification, the provisioning system and accounting 
standards in Russia are based on the backward looking approach. According to Sood (2011) the 
backward looking approach is a sign of the pro-cyclicality of loan loss provisioning behaviour 
since it does not allow the creation of loan loss provisions beforehand. Barisitz &Lahnsteiner (p. 
82, 2010) graph below indicates the backward looking provisions in Russia which follow the 
same dynamic as non-performing loans. 
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Graph 1. Loan loss provisions in Russia. 
 
However a World Bank survey (2003) states the requirement of loan loss provisions for standard 
loans, as in Russia, can be a sign of the forward-looking approach. In addition it is mentioning 
that Ukrainian regulations also fix the minimum rate of provisions for a standard category of 
loans (National Bank of Ukraine, 1998). Lee & Haque (2011) based their research on the 
example of Kazakhstani banks which they observed between 2007 and 2010.  They state that 
bank capital regulation in Kazakhstan is pro-cyclical meaning that it negatively influences loan 
growth during economic downturns. Decrease of lending levels during periods of poor economic 
performance generally leads to a deeper recession in the country (Gonzales, 2009).  
Therefore we can expect that the provisioning behavior of Kazakh banks could be pro-cyclical 
since, as previously mentioned, pro-cyclical capital regulation could account for the loan loss 
provisions. Accounting rules in Russia are based mainly on the backward looking approach 
therefore provisioning behaviour in this country is more likely to be pro-cyclical. However, as 
mentioned before Russia and Ukraine have signs of the forward looking approach in their 
provisioning regulation which may indicate the existence of evidence mitigating the banks pro-
cyclical provisioning behavior. Since Russian and Ukrainian banks constitute the largest part of 
the sample we suggest that our empirical results will be driven to a greater extent by these 
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countries.  The other  hypotheses, to our knowledge, have not been discussed with reference to 
CIS banking systems in existing research. 
CHAPTER 2: Review of CIS region 
The CIS was formed in 1991 after the Soviet Union’s collapse. The CIS region includes 11 
countries as of 2011. They are Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Moldova.  All CIS members signed an 
Agreement on economic union which implies the unconstrained movement of the labor force, 
capitals, goods; elaboration of agreed tax, custom policies and elimination of differences in 
methods regulating economic activity of the member-countries.  (Intergovernmental statistical 
committee, 2011). According to the Expert Ra, rating agency (2007), as of 2007 Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Ukraine were the leading countries in CIS banking sector by economic characteristics 
and their demand for the ratings services. This can be seen from Table 1 and 2 below.  
Table 1. Activity of the international rating agencies in the banking sector of CIS countries 
Country Number of banks 
rated by Fitch 
Number of banks rated by 
Moody's 
Azerbaijan 3 3 
Armenia 1 2 
Belarus 5 0 
Kazakhstan 12 15 
Kyrgyzstan 0 1 
Moldova 0 0 
Russia 44 65 
Tajikistan 0 0 
Turkmenistan 0 0 
Uzbekistan 1 0 
Ukraine 16 24 
As of 15.04.07. Sources: websites of  Moody’s Investor Service, Fitch IBCA 
  (Expert Ra, rating agency, 2007)  
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Table 2.Comparison of the economic characteristics of CIS countries: 








































Russia 533,4 305 321,6 64,3 6,8 1017 7,1 9 
Kazakhstan 69,9 41,5 38,7 6,9 10,6 77,9 5,1 8,6 
Ukraine 67,4 48,6 36,5 8,4 7,1 106 2,3 11,6 
Belarus 13,6 9,2 6,8 2,1 9,9 37 7,8 6,6 
Uzbekistan 5,8 3,9 3 0,8 7,8 16,8 0,6 6,8 
Azerbaijan 4,3 2,4 2,4 0,6 34,5 20,4 2,5 11,4 
Moldova 1,8 1,1 1,3 3 4 3,4 0,9 14,1 
Armenia 1,4 0,7 0,9 0,3 13,9 6,4 2 5 
(Source: Expert Ra, rating agency,2007)  
Our research will focus on these three leading CIS countries since data from these countries 
illustrate the main trends in the CIS banking sector.  
2.1. Kazakhstan. 
2.1.1. Economy 
   The Republic of Kazakhstan is rich in mineral resources and vast agricultural lands usable for 
grain production and live farming. Mining is the main source of the country’s economic growth 
and oil and gas are the leading economic sectors (Wikipedia) According to International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) report (2010) in 2009 Kazakhstan was the 18th largest oil producer in the 
world and second after Russia among CIS countries. The IMF reported that one quarter of the 
nation’s GDP was from oil production which constituted 60 % of the total export and 40% of the 
country’s budget. ‘Proven reserves are now estimated at 30 billion barrels (similar to Nigeria and 
exceeding Algeria, Mexico and the United States) due to the discovery of oil in the Kashagan 
field in the Caspian Sea’ (IMF, 2010, p.11). Agriculture is also a promising sector of the 
economy. Kazakhstan is the third largest grain producer in the CIS region after Russia and 
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Ukraine (Wikipedia). According to the IMF report (2010) by 2014 it is estimated that the 
agricultural sector will satisfy 80% of domestic food demand. Kazakhstan was the first country 
in the CIS region to obtain an investment grade from international rating agencies such as 
Moody’s investors’ service, Standard & Poors, Fitch rating Ltd (Ministry of economic 
development and trade of Kazakhstan (MEDT), 2010). The development of the country’s rating 
can be seen in Table 3.  
Table 3. Country rating of Kazakhstan. 























Source: Ministry of economic development and trade of Kazakhstan, 2010 
Table 4. Main macroeconomic figures for Kazakhstan 
Indexes 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GDP (USD bln) 43,2 57,1 81 104,9 133,4 115,3 146,9 
Real GDP growth (%) 9,6 9,7 10,7 8,9 3,3 1,2 5,4 
Inflation, consumer 
prices (annual,%) 6,9 7,6 8,6 10,8 17,2 7,3 7,8 
Unemployment rate (%) 8,4 8,1 7,8 7,3 6,6 6,6 5,8 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
In general, as Table 4 indicates macroeconomic figures show economic growth in Kazakhstan 
during the period from 2004 to 2006 meaning that GDP increased from $43.2 in 2004 to $81 
billion in 2006 while unemployment decreased over the same period from 8.4% in 2004 to 7.8% 
in 2006. However inflation increased reaching 8.6% in 2006 compared to 2004 when it was 6. 
9%.  
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From 2007 to 2009 real GDP growth declined significantly, starting fall from 10.7% in 2006 to 
1.2% in 2009. This negative dynamic in the economic growth was a reflection of the global 
financial crisis. In 2010 real GDP growth increased up to 5.4% which according to the Kazakh 
government was caused by the favorable conditions on the global market for metal and power 
resources; the implementation of timely anti-recessionary measures and creating a basis for 
further post-recessionary actions.    
2.1.2. Banking system  
Kazakhstan has a two-tier banking system represented by the National Bank of Republic of 
Kazakhstan (NBRK) as the first tier and remaining banks constituting the second tier. The 
exception is the Development Bank of Kazakhstan which operates under a special law 
(Wikipedia). As of the end of 2010 there were 39 second-tier banks including the one state bank 
and thirty eight commercial banks, twenty of which are banks with foreign participation 
(Financial Supervision Agency of Kazakhstan (FSA),2011) 
According to the IMF report (2004) positive economic growth in the early 2000s and reforms 
implemented in the financial sector played an important role in the further formation of a sound 
banking system in Kazakhstan. One of the most important and challenging steps made by the 
country was the implementation of international banking standards. For example, Basel I Capital 
Accord was adopted in 1996 (Pirani, 2011), in 2003 banks were obliged to use International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (IMF, 2004). Consequently, these events entailed 
improvements in bank supervision as well as in their risk management systems (IMF, 2004). 
Basel II rules were adopted in 2005 (Peresetsky, 2010).   Regulation on the basis of Basel III is 
planned by regulator to implement in Kazakhstan in 2013 while Basel Committee’s deadline is 
2019.(Pirani, 2011). 
Apart from favorable economic conditions in the country during pre-crisis period, which 
improved to some extent the standard of living of Kazakh people, growing confidence in banks 
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among the population as well as the creation of a Deposit Insurance Fund, all these factors 
influenced significant deposit growth. The main indicators of Kazakhstani banking sector can be 
seen in Table 5. 
Table 5. Indicators of Kazakh banking sector 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Commercial banks 
(number)  34 33 35 37 38 39 
Major indicators of the banking sector, US$ million    
Assets 33 701 69 859 97 129 98 432 77 837 81 614 
Capital 3 297 6 854 11 846 12 026 -6 601 8 967 
Loans 22 869 47 181 73 718 76 534 64 926 60 627 
Provisions for loans 1 276 2 342 4 337 8 491 24 458 18 995 
% of total loans 5,6 5 5,9 11,1 37,7 31,3 
Deposits 12 471 24 979 32 451 38 084 40 441 46 850 
Net profit 538 801 1 806 89 -19 225 9 904 
Profitability ratios, % 
NIM 3,7 3,3 5,2 5,8 3,1 3 
ROAA 1,6 1,1 1,9 0,1 loss 12,1 
RoAE 16,3 11,7 15,2 0,7 loss 110,4 
Banking sector and the economy, % 
Assets/GDP 59 86,2 92,6 73,8 67,5 55,6 
Loans/GDP 40,1 58,2 70,3 57,4 56,3 41,3 
Deposits/GDP 21,8 30,8 30,9 28,5 35,1 31,9 
Source: Kazakhstan Financial Review December 2010, Kazkommertsbank 
 
However deposit increase was not the only source of the credit growth in the banking sector: 
external borrowings formed a substantial part of the bank loan funding base. According to the 
IMF report (2010, p 3) between 2000 and 2007 Kazakh banks ‘borrowed heavily abroad’ in 
order to fund their credit expansion. By 2007 external debts of Kazakhstani banks reached 44% 
of GDP (Table 6).  
Table 6. Bank external debt of Kazakhstan.                                (Mln USD) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Bank 
external 
debt 7 682 15 316 33 323 45 946 39 221 30 082 20 024 
% of 
GDP 18 27 41 44 29 26 14 
Source: National Bank of Kazakhstan, web-site 
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2.1.3. Financial crisis impact  
Kazakhstan was the first country in the CIS region affected by the global crisis mainly because 
banks borrowed heavily from abroad in order to credit the country’s economy (IMF, 2010). 
During the 2007 global crisis Kazakhstan faced significant external debts, which reached 44% of 
GDP in 2007 (Table 6).  Limited access to external funds caused a decrease in lending levels 
which in turn caused a reaction with a decline in business and social conditions. As a result 
banks faced the problem of non-payments of credit, which was indicated by higher levels of non-
performing loans from 3.5 % in 2008 to 26 % of the total loans in 2010 (IMF,2010). The growth 
of the non-performing loans resulted in increased provisioning levels from 6% of total loans in 
2007 to 37 % in 2010 (IMF, 2010). Capital within the banking sector decreased from 11% of 
GDP to negative 3% of GDP in 2010 which was caused mainly by the significant increase of 
provisioning levels (IMF, 2010). The situation was worsened by a fall in commodity prices 
during mid-2008-2009, which led producers to decrease oil exports and other commodities 
(Nuttall,2008) . As a consequence GDP fell from $133 in 2008 to $115 bn in 2009 (Table 4).   
Four financial institutions, two of which were among the country’s top ten largest banks, ceased 
payments of their external liabilities (IMF,2010). 
The government elaborated an anti-crisis plan in 2008 which aimed to support the financial 
SME, agricultural and construction sectors. As of May 2010 the overall amount spent on anti-
crisis measures equaled $10.7 bn (IMF,2010). The source of the funds was the National Oil Fund 
which was established in 2001 and aimed to accumulate oil income for future generations. Its 
main purpose is to decrease dependency on the budget funds during difficult economic   (IMF 
survey, 2010). 
By 2010 the restructuring of the three banks external debts was completed (FSA,2010) Overall 
the restructuring of external liabilities together with further regular external debt repayments by 
the other banks in terms of the limited access to the foreign borrowings  led to a significant 
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decrease in the bank’s total external debt from $45.94 million in 2007 (44% of GDP) to $20.02 
million in 2010 (14% of GDP) (Table 6) (IMF, 2010) .  According Ivanova et al’s (2010) 
research (2010) Kazakhstan was the first country in the CIS region which implemented counter-
cyclical measures of financial institutions’ regulation. Counter-cyclical methods include 
provisioning issues, increase of equity, reserves and liquidity and their usage during recessions.  
The FSA report (2010) notes that in 2012 Kazakhstan is planning to adopt dynamic reserves. 
Dynamic reserves aim to accumulate funds during booming economy and use them during 
recession which should lead to the lessen pressure on the banks profitability.  
2.1.4. Loan loss provisioning: 
   According to the FSA (2006) specific provisions (reserves) must be formed by a bank in case 
of the assets depreciation caused by non-performing (or possible non-performing) or inadequate 
performing (or possible inadequate performing) of liabilities by a borrower as per contract 
conditions. For the purpose of the provisions’ calculation all assets are divided into two groups: 
classified and standard assets. Standard assets are assets which are considered as normal ones 
without any danger of non repayment. Classified assets imply assets with non performed contract 
conditions or where there is a possibility of their breaching.   Classified assets in their turn are 
divided into two groups: doubtful and bad assets.  Classification of assets should be determined 
by banks depending on the financial state of the borrower, presence of the overdue payment 
under the classifying asset and borrower’s rating which are also determined by the bank.  
Provisions should be created for all classified assets according to FSA requirements. 
Provisions are calculated on the basis of the principal amount at the rate established by the 
regulators’ less highly liquid collateral. Provisions are subject to reconsideration by the banks on 
the monthly basis. For classification purposes, credits are divided into individual credits, 
homogenous credits’ portfolio, investment loans, mortgage and interbank credits.    
Provisioning rate depends on the category of the classified assets (Table 7).  
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
28 
 




















  1   2   3 4   
1. Standard 
loans 
              
2. Doubtful 
loans : 
              
 1) doubtful of 
1st category – 
in case of 
timely and full 
payments 
5 5 0,01- 5 0,01- 5 5 5 5 
2) doubtful of 
2nd category – 




10 10 5,01 - 10 5,01 - 10 10 10 10 
3) doubtful of 
3rd category - 
in case of 
timely and full 
payments 
20 20 10,01 - 20 10,01 - 20 20 20 20 
4) doubtful of 
4th category – 




25 25 20,01 - 25 20,01 - 25 25 25 25 
 5) doubtful of 
5th category 
50 50 25,01 - 50 25,01 - 50 50 50 50 
3. Bad loans 100 100 50,01 - 100 50,01 - 100 100 100 100 
Source: FSA, 2006 
General provisions are part of Tier 2 capital and should not be more that 1.25% of the risk 
weighted assets for calculation of the regulatory bank capital (NBRK,2002). 
2.2. Russia. 
2.2.1. Economy 
Russia is the largest oil, gas and coal producer in the world. ‘Russia’s breakdown of GDP by 
composition shows a services-oriented country with a strong industrial base. 57.9% of the 
economy is driven by services, 37% by industry and 5.2% by agriculture’ (EconomyWatch, 
2011). The oil and gas sectors play important roles in the country’s economy since it is one of 
the main sources of the country’s revenues. According the Bogetic et al (2010) the sector formed 
60% of the total country’s export in 2007. Oil revenues in federal budget increased from 30% in 
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2004 to 46% in 2010. (The constructive project,2010). The oil and gas sectors formed 23.5% of 
GDP in 2008, 18.9% in 2009 and 22.9% in 2010 (Bashmakov, 2011) The countries dependence 
on oil and gas reserves had a negative impact since oil prices are usually volatile and difficult to 
predict. For example, oil prices fell from $140 per barrel in mid-2008 to $40-50 at the beginning 
of 2009 increasing $70 by the end of the year (Bogetic et al, 2010). As a result we can observe 
the same dynamic in GDP figures which grew in 2006 and 2007 before falling over the next two 
years (Table 8).  
In order to mitigate the impact of oil price volatility impact on the country’s budget part of the 
oil revenues were saved in a stabilization fund. The Stabilization Fund was created in 2004 and 
in 2008 was split into oil a Reserve Fund and National Welfare Fund. The accumulated revenues 
of oil Reserve Funds are used when oil prices fall (Wikipedia) As of the 1st February 2008 the 
Reserve fund had accumulated $125.19 billion while by the second half of 2011 this had fallen to 
$26. 60 bln (Ministry of finance of Russian Federation (MFRF), 2011), due to significant oil 
price decline during this period. Bogetic et al (2010) pointed out that creation of such funds was 
evidence of Russia’s counter-cyclical fiscal policy, in contrast to the notion that that oil-
dependent countries apply for pro-cyclical fiscal policy.      
Bogetic et al, 2010, argue that oil rich countries gained access to capital markets and therefore 
increased their debt levels. Russia is not exception: between 2004 and 2010 the aggregate 
external debt almost doubled from $213. 45 million in 2004, to $489.043 million in 2010 
(MFRF,2011). As with Kazakhstan external borrowings of Russian banks and private 
corporations constituted the largest part of the total country’s debt (93. 4% in 2008 and 90. 6% in 
2010). (Kosenkova, 2011). The main reason for increasing external private sector debt was the 
insufficient level of internal financial market development including the banking sector. Banks 
were unable to satisfy the economy’s demand for long-term financing for the realization of large 
projects, besides this external funds were more favourable towards longer lending periods and 
cheaper prices (Kosenkova, 2011). Based on Table 8 we can see that the highest economic 
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growth within period from 2004 to 2010 was experienced by the country in 2007 when GDP 
reached the highest growth rate of 8.5%, inflation declined to its lowest rate of 9% and 
unemployment fell to 6.1 %. On the contrary in 2009 figures show evidence of the global crises 
with the lowest GDP growth and highest unemployment and inflation rates.    
Table 8. Macroeconomic data, Russia 
Indexes 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GDP (USD bln) 591 764 989,9 1299,7 1666,9 1231,8 1474,4 
Real GDP growth (%) 7,2 6,4 8,2 8,5 5,2 -7,9 4 
Inflation, consumer 
prices (annual,%) 10,9 12,7 9,7 9 14,1 11,7 6,86 
Unemployment rate 
(%) 7,8 7,2 7,2 6,1 6,3 8,4 7,5 
Source: IMF and Rosstat 
2.2.2. Banking system 
The Russian Federation’s banking system is represented by the Central Bank of Russian 
Federation (CBRF) and commercial banks together forming a two-tier banking system. The 
number of second tier banks was 1 058 at the beginning of 2010 (Table 9). All commercial banks 
can be divided into three groups (Doronkin et al, 2011). The first is formed by state banks; the 
second consists of banks controlled by foreign capital. According to the Russian legislation 
foreign banks are prohibited from opening branches in the territory of Russia therefore foreign 
banks use the option of opening affiliated banks or purchasing local banks. The third group is 
represented by commercial banks controlled by the residents of the Russian Federation. As of 1st 
May 2010 second tier banks were represented by 15 state banks, 106 banks operated with the 
participation of foreign capital and the remaining 937 banks belonged to the third group. 
(Doronkin et al, 2011). The top 5 banks were represented mainly by state banks as of 2010 their 
assets constituted 50% of the banking sector’s total assets. (Doronkin et al,2011). 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) were implemented in Russia in 2004 
(CBRF). Some requirements of Basel II with regard to operational risks were included in the 
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banking regulation in 2010. The question of implementation of the remaining conditions of Basel 
II as well as the new Basel III is still open (Interfax, 2010).According to Doronkin et al (2011), 
development of Russia’s banking sector from 2006 to 2010 can be divided into three periods:  
The first period: 2005-early 2008 was a time of vigorous development of the sector; the second 
period from the second half of 2008 until the first half of 2009 can be characterized as the period 
of crisis, when the sector experienced problems with liquidity, deterioration in the quality of 
assets and the shrinkage of lending in the economy while the third period from the second half of 
2009 until 2010 was a period of economic stabilization and a gradual increase of lending in the 
economy. 
Table 9. Indicators of the banking sector, Russia. 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Commercial banks (number)  1189 1136 1108 1058 1021 
Major indicators of the banking sector, US$ million    
Assets 530 326 819 759 953 788 973 214 
1 109 
074 
Capital 64 287 108 818 129 717 152 797 155 259 
Loans 304 994 500 492 562 522 532 920 595 397 
Provisions for loans  in % of total 
loans 4,1 3,6 4,5 9,1 8,5 
Deposits 326 623 497 446 499 714 563 564 687 168 
Profitability ratios, % 
ROAA 3,3 3 1,8 0,7 1,9 
RoAE 26,3 22,7 13,3 4,9 12,5 
Banking sector and the economy, % 
Assets/GDP 53,57 63,07 57,22 79,01 75,22 
Loans/GDP 30,81 38,51 33,75 43,26 40,38 
Deposits/GDP 33 38,27 29,98 45,75 46,61 
Source: Central Bank of RF  
From the beginning of 2006 the banking sector played an important role in the economy of the 
country. Bank assets almost doubled from 2006 to 2010, which was an increase from 54% of 
GDP to 75% of GDP in 2010 (Table 9). Lending increased from 31% of GDP in 2006 to 47% of 
GDP in 2010 (Doronkin et al, 2011). As mentioned due to the limited capacity of Russian banks 
and access to the lower interest rates of international financial institutions, banks were more 
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interested in borrowing funds abroad.(Bogetic et al,2010) As a result the banks’ external debt 
doubled from 5% of GDP in 2004 to 10% of GDP in 2010 (Table  10). 
Table 10. Bank external debt, Russia.                                                    Mln USD 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Bank 
external 
debt 32 341 50 144 101 161 163 656 166 280 127 212 144 225 
% of 
GDP 5 7 10 13 10 10 10 
Source: Central Bank of Russia 
According to Bogetic et al (2010), the loan-deposit ratio of the whole banking sector rose from 
126% in 2005 to 149% in 2008 which was a consequence of the increased borrowing from 
abroad. Moreover, some features of the bank credit portfolio exposed the banks to credit and 
liquidity risks. One of them was that in some cases assets and liabilities, in fact, did not match 
each other, which mean that medium term projects could be financed through short term foreign 
loans with rollover agreements therefore leading the corporate borrowers to make repayments 
from the working capital. Another feature of the lending practice of the Russian banks was weak 
loan portfolio diversification, namely the real estate and construction sectors constituted the 
largest part of the loan portfolio. In addition to that banks relied on real estate as the main 
collateral and therefore exposed themselves to the unpredictable changes in the real estate prices 
(Bogetic et al, 2010). All these features together with the worsening macroeconomic situation in 
the country made the country more responsive to the global financial crisis impact.      
 
2.2.3. Financial crisis impact 
A significant fall in oil prices in the second half of 2008 together with the capital outflows and 
limited access to the external funds led the country to liquidity problems (Bogetic et al, 2010). 
As a result the country experienced a decline in economic growth, with real GDP growth 
decreasing from 5.2% in 2008 to -7.9% in 2009 (Table 8), unemployment increased from 6.3% 
in 2008 to  8.4% in 2009. This situation was harmful for the banking sector due to the worsening 
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repayment capacity of the bank borrowers which in its turn led to the deterioration of the loan 
portfolio quality. 
As Dorbec (2010) notes non-performing loans increased from 2.1% of the total loans in 2008 to 
5.1% of total loans in 2009. According to the Central Bank of Russia’s definition non-
performing loans are loans which are overdue for more than one day. If a loan consists of several 
tranches then only the overdue tranche is used in calculation of the non-performing loan.  
Overall we can observe that non-performing loans almost doubled within one year. Provisioning 
levels followed the same dynamic, namely it also doubled from 4.5% of the total loans in 2008 to 
9.1% in 2009 (Table 9). By early 2009 twenty banks were under procedures of bankruptcy 
prevention and four bank mergers were fulfilled (Doronkin et al, 2011). 
The Russian government, faced with the worsening situation in the country’s economy, 
conducted supportive measures for the amount equal to 4 % of GDP ( Dorbec, 2010). The largest 
part was directed to the banks as most had suffered from the crisis in the economy. The source of 
the Russian authorities’ support was the National Welfare Fund where $220 bn or 13 % of GDP 
were accumulated. Thanks to the saving funds, Russia was one of the CIS countries which did 
not apply for the external assistance ( Dorbec, 2010). 
Moreover during the period January till September 2008 the Central Bank of RF raised the rates 
of allocation to the fund of compulsory reserves four times. The rate of compulsory reserves 
under credit organizations obligations before banks- non-residents within this period increased 
from 3.5% to 8.5%. Thus, the Central Bank of RF created a liquidity cushion in the banks which 
was used during the peak of the crisis (Doronkin et al, 2011). Among other anti-crisis measures 
in the banking sector Doronkin named credits from the Central Bank of RF to commercial banks 
without collateral, support to the large banks, increase of the guaranteed amount of deposits, 
recapitalization of banks through subordinated loans.   
 
2.2.4. Loan loss provisioning 
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Specific provisions in Russia are considered as bank’s expenses and aim to cover bank losses 
due to the non-performing loans.(Belyakov, 2002) According to the Russian legislation all loans 
are divided into two groups for creation of loan loss provisions. They are individual loans and 
homogenous group of loans.  The first group consists of the loans which differ from other bank 
loans, while loans included in the homogenous group of the loans possess similar characteristics 
of the credit risk and the amount of each loan should not exceed 0.5% of the bank’s capital.  For 
the purpose of the specific provisions creation all individual loans should be grouped into five 
categories of quality. They are standard, non-standard, doubtful, problem and hopeless loans.  
Determination of the quality group should be made by the professional judgment of the banks 
based on assessment of the financial conditions of the borrower and quality of obligations 
fulfillment under loan agreement by the borrower as Table 11. 
 
Table 11. Table for determination of loan’s quality category   
Debt repayment /        























 Source: Rules of Central Bank RF, 26 March 2004 
The loan loss provisions should be created on the basis of the respective loan classification as per 
Table 12 below.  
 Table 12 The size of loan loss provisions for individual loans  
Loan category  
The amount of reserves (in % 
of principal amount) 
1st category of quality (standard loan) 0% 
2nd category of quality (non-standard loan) 1%-20% 
3rd category of quality (doubtful loan) 21%-50% 
4th category of quality (problem loan) 51%-100% 
5th category of quality (hopeless loan) 100% 
Source: Rules of Central Bank RF, 26 March 2004 




Homogenous group of credits is classified on the basis of the overdue period (Table 13). Banks 
can choose any from two options for the loan loss provisions creation, except for the loans to 
SME sector which should refer to only option 1. 
Table 13.The size of loan loss provisions for homogenous group of loans. 
Homogenous group of 
loans  
Loans extended to individuals 
(option 1), small and medium 
enterprises (SME) 
Loans extended to 















repayments  0,50% 1% 
0,75% 1,50% 
with overdue 
repayments (from 1 to 
30 calendar days) 1,50% 3% 
with overdue 
repayments (from 31 to 
90 calendar days) 10% 20% 10% 20% 
with overdue 
repayments (from 91 to 
180 calendar days) 35% 50% 35% 50% 
with overdue 
repayments (over 180 
calendar days) 75% 
Source: Rules of Central Bank RF, 26 March 2004 
Provisions created under the loans which constitute the first risk category of the loan 
classification or in other words under the riskless loans (without overdue payments) should be 
counted as a part of additional bank capital (Tier 2 capital). For the purpose of regulatory capital 
calculation general provisions can be included in the additional capital for an amount not 
exceeding 1.25% of the risk weighted assets (CBRF, 2003). 
2.3. Ukraine. 
2.3.1. Economy 
Metallurgy is a leading sector in the Ukrainian industry forming 20% of the country’s GDP. 
Increase of ferrous metal prices in 2007 and 2008 provided 32% of export proceeds however due 
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to the decline of prices in 2009 this figure later decreased to 25.4% (InfoMine, 2010). According 
to Association of Ukrainian Banks (AUB,2010) the period from 2001 to 2004 can be 
characterized as a period of revival of the country’s economy and the highest GDP growth 12 % 
was recorded in 2004 (Table 14).  The driving source of the economic growth in 2004 was 
industrial production and the agricultural sector. The deposit base of the commercial banks 
started to grow and led to an increased number of credits to the real sector of the country. As a 
result, GDP increased while  inflation fell to 9% in 2004. (AUB, 2010) 
The period 2005-2008 was a new level of economic development (AUB, 2010). Namely 2005 
was marked by a sharp decline in GDP from 12% in 2004 to 2.7% in 2005 (Table 14). The 
reasons for this were decrease of ferrous metals prices and a worsening political situation in the 
country (IMF,2005). Overall the period 2005 to 2008 can be characterized as a period of gradual 
increase in external debt especially banking debts from 7% of GDP in 2005 to 22% in 2008 
(Table 16) . The problem of increasing external debt was that the most of the received funds 
were directed to the consuming sector instead of the real sector. As a consequence inflation grew 
from 13.6% in 2005 to 25.2% in 2008. (Table 14) 
Table 14. Macroeconomic data, Ukraine 
Indexes 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GDP (USD bln) 64,8 86,1 107,7 142,7 180,3 113,5 137 
Real GDP growth (%) 12,1 2,7 7,3 7,9 2,1 -15,1 4,2 
Inflation, consumer 
prices (annual,%) 9 13,6 9,1 12,8 25,2 15,9 9,4 
Unemployment rate 
(%) 8,6 7,2 6,8 6,4 6,4 8,8 8,4 
Source:IMF and Ukrstat 
2.3.2. Banking system 
Ukraine’s banking sector consists of the National Bank which is a first-tier bank and commercial 
banks representing the second-tier of the system. As of 2010 the banking sector included 194 
second-tier banks (Table 15), including eighteen banks under liquidation, fifty five banks with 
participation of the foreign capital and five state banks. (National Bank of Ukraine, 2011)  
During the period 2004 until 2008 Ukrainian banks increased their loans by 612%, which was 
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the second highest among CIS, Middle and East European banks (Kirchner et al, 2011). The 
negative side of such credit growth was that most loans were extended for consumer and 
mortgage lending which meant that the real sector received fewer funds for its development. 
Good economic conditions in the country in 2004 with low inflation and GDP growth, increased 
trust in the banking sector leading to a rise in banks deposit base.  
Between 2005 and 2008 the level of foreign capital in the banking sector reached almost 40%.  
Besides within this period banks started to borrow heavily from abroad (AUB, 2010) increasing 
the vulnerability of the banking sector due to the currency and maturity mismatches (Kirchner et 
al, 2011). Namely, loan to deposit ratio in the foreign currencies stood at 130% in 2006, 250% in 
2008, 290% in 2009 and 200% in 2010. Foreign exchange long term loans to time deposit (with 
maturity more than 2 years) ratio was at 624% in 2006 and peaked at 1,100% in 2009 due to the 
faster pace of deposit withdrawals rather than long-term credits repayments (Kirchner et al, 
2011). The rest of the important figures and their dynamics during the period from 2006 to 2010 
can be seen in Table 15. 
Table 15. Data on the banking sector, Ukraine 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Commercial banks 
(number)  193 198 198 197 194 
Major indicators of the banking sector, US$ million    
Assets 67 362 118 692 120 271 110 314 118 353 
Capital 8 429 13 778 15 489 14 433 17 302 
Loans 53 326 96 112 102 889 93 653 94 853 
Provisions for loans 2 425 3 659 5 779 12 436 14 192 
% of total loans 5 4 6 13 15 
Deposits 58 933 104 914 104 782 95 881 101 051 
Net profit 821 1311 949 -4 818 -1 637 
Profitability ratios, % 
NIM 5,3 5,03 5,3 6,21 5,79 
ROAA 1,61 1,5 1,03 loss loss 
RoAE 13,52 12,67 8,51 loss loss 
Banking sector and the economy, % 
Assets/GDP 63 83 67 97 86 
Loans/GDP 50 67 57 83 69 
Deposits/GDP 55 74 58 84 74 
Source: National Bank of Ukraine 




Table 16. Bank external debt, Ukraine                                            (Mln USD) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Bank external debt 
(mln USD) 2 662 6 112 14 089 30 949 39 471 30 861 28 119 
% of GDP 4 7 13 22 22 27 21 
Source: National bank of Ukraine 
2.3.3. Financial crisis impact 
Ukraine was suffered the most from the economic crisis.  GDP in 2009 decreased by 15.1%, 
which was the highest fall among CIS and European countries. (Kirchner et al, 2011). The 
factors influencing the depth of the global crisis impact were almost the same as in Russia and 
Kazakhstan: decrease of the world commodity and metals prices, the fall of external lending, 
however the situation in Ukraine deteriorated additionally due to political instability which in its 
turn caused delayed implementation of anti-crisis measures.   
From the fourth quarter of 2008 due to the global crisis impact, the asset quality of Ukrainian 
banks started to deteriorate. The sharp increase of the problem loans was caused by the 
worsening of individuals’ and legal entities’ financial conditions, weak underwriting policy 
during credit boom, weak loan portfolio diversification and significant crediting in foreign 
currencies (Malyukova et al, 2011).  There is no consensus in the level of non-performing loans 
since National Bank of Ukraine, rating agencies and the IMF used different ways of determining 
non-performing loans. According to the IMF, non-performing loans increased significantly from 
13.2% in 2007 to 41.6% in the first part of 2010 (Kirchner et al, 2011).  According to Standard & 
Poors rating agency definition non-performing loans also include restructuring loans and 
therefore reached 50% in 2010 (Malyukova et al, 2011).  The growth of non-performing loans 
had slowed down by the end of 2010 and at the beginning of 2011, banks increased their capital 
and loans loss reserves from 6% in 2008 to 15% in 2010, which are good signs for banking 
sector (Malyukova et al, 2011).  
September 2008 was known as the time of massive deposit withdrawals in foreign and local 
currencies (Kirchner et al, 2011).  Decrease of the deposit base and limited access to external 
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funds caused shrinkage in the volume of credit.  This gap which appeared on the liabilities side 
of banks’ balance sheets was covered by governmental and external support such as loans from 
the IMF. In particular the IMF extended a loan of $16.5 bn to the Ukrainian government in the 
second half of 2008. The aim of the IMF’s loan was to support macroeconomic and financial 
stability in the country. However in 2009 this programme was suspended and new Stand-By 
agreement was signed for amount of $14.9 bn in the second half of 2010. (Kirchner et al, 2011)   
In order to encourage the population to save money in banks the government tripled the 
guaranteed amount of deposits from UAH 50,000 to UAH 150,000 in the end of 2008. Besides 
for the same purposed National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) froze time deposits for 6 months starting 
from October 2008.   (Kirchner et al, 2011)   
2.3.4. Loan loss provisioning 
Loan loss provisioning in the Ukraine does not differ significantly by the way of provisioning 
creation from the Russian model. The only difference is that the Ukraine creates provisions on 
all standard loans which are determined as riskless ones.  According to Ukrainian legislation 
there are two types of loan loss provisions: general and specific provisions. General provisions 
should be created for standard loans, while specific provisions cover risks under non-standard 
loans, which consist of the loans under control, sub-standard loans, doubtful and hopeless loans. 
The type of the loan is determined by the commercial banks on the basis of financial status of the 
borrower and his diligence in loan repayment. Depending on such characteristics of the borrower 
banks define the loan category as in Table 17 and accrue respective reserves as Table 18. 
Table 17. Classification of loans. 
Diligence in loan repayment/loan 
category as per financial status of 




B under control sub-standard doubtful 
C sub-standard doubtful hopeless 
D  doubtful hopeless hopeless 
E hopeless hopeless hopeless 
The source: National Bank of Ukraine, 1998. 
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According to the financial status of the borrower loans can be divided into 5 categories: A-very 
good, B- good, C-satisfactory level with signs of deterioration, D- bad, E – very bad with no 
signs that obligations of the borrower will be fulfilled. Depending on the borrower’s loan 
repayment they are good performers if there are no overdue payments, weak performance with 
overdue amounts less than 90 days and bad performance with overdue repayments more than 90 
days.  
Table 18 The level of provisions. 
Type of the loan The level of reserves 
Standard 2% 




The source: National Bank of Ukraine, 1998. 
According to Ukrainian bank legislation, general reserves should be included in the calculation 
of the regulatory bank capital.  
CHAPTER 3: The model and the data 
3.1. The model: 
Following Bikker and Metzemakers’s paper (2005), we test three hypotheses: pro-cyclicality, 
capital management and income-smoothing hypotheses. For these purposes we employ 
regression analysis tools. The multiple regression equation being tested in STATA 11 
programme follows to a greater extent the models used by Bikker & Metzemakers (2005), 
Laeven & Majnoni (2003) in their research and is as follows: 
LLP it = δ LLPi,t-1 + β1CAP it + β2 LOANS it +β3 EBTP it +β4 GDP it + β5UNEMPLOYMENT it  + 
β6 DEBT it + β7 DUMMY_VAR it +ν i+ ϵ it,   
Where loan loss provisions (LLP) are a dependent variable and measured as the ratio of the loan 
loss provisions to the total assets. The loan loss provisions represent the sum of specific and 
general loan loss provisions. (LLPi,t-1) is one-period lag of LLP. Independent variables are 
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represented by the three bank-related variables: the ratio of loans to total assets (LOANS), the 
capital ratio (CAP),  the ratio of earnings before taxes and provisions to total assets (EBTP) and 
four variables reflecting the macroeconomic situation in the CIS countries including 
unemployment rate (UNEMPLOYMENT) and real GDP growth rate (GDP). As against the 
model of Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) and Laeven & Majnoni (2003) we extend the 
regression model with the additional independent variable, natural logarithm of external banking 
debt (DEBT).  (DUMMY_VAR) refers to the dummy variable reflecting the change of LLP 
during non-crisis and crisis periods. 
i= 1-64 (banks), t=2004-2010, δ – coefficient for lagged dependent variable (LLPi,t-1), β-  
coefficient measuring the change of dependent variable after unit change of independent 
variables, ν – bank’s heterogeneity and  ε – the error term, which  represents other factors 
influencing the dependent variable. We use log-log regression model where unit is defined as 1 
%. 
The regression model tests H0 hypothesis: that there is no correlation between dependent and 
independent variables and HA: that there is a correlation between dependent and independent 
variables. If p-value for each independent variable is less or equal to significance level which in 
our case equals to 0.05, H0 hypothesis is rejected and alternative hypothesis is accepted. Signs 
(+) or (-) of β will support or reject our research hypotheses in the following manner: 
Table 19. Testing hypotheses 
Testing hypotheses Yes, if No, if 
Pro-cyclical provisioning behavior 
β2<0      β4<0       
β5>0                  β6<0 
β7<0 
Β2>0 β4>0          
β5<0               β6>0 
Β7>0 
Capital management hypothesis β 1<0 β 1>0 
Income-smoothing hypothesis β3>0  β3<0 
(Summary of empirical results from the existing research such as Laeven & Majnoni, 2003; Bikker&Metzemakers, 
2005; Bouvatier&Lepetit, 2008)  
The pro-cyclicality hypothesis 
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Pro-cyclicality hypothesis implies that relationships between loan loss provisions and business 
cycles are negative or, in other words, loan loss provisions grow during economic downturns and 
decline during periods of economic growth (Hsieh et al, 2008).  Regression models of empirical 
research vary from one survey to another. Based on the models used in Bikker & Metzemakers 
(2005),Hsieh et al (2008); Laeven & Majnoni’s (2003) papers we choose three independent 
variables for our model which, to our mind, precisely reflects the countries business cycle: they 
include real GDP growth, the unemployment rate and loans as a portion of assets. GDP growth 
and unemployment rates describe the macroeconomic situation in the country. Namely if the 
country experiences bad times, the GDP falls and unemployment grows. Therefore we expect a 
negative correlation of loan loss provisions with GDP growth and a positive correlation with 
unemployment meaning that banks tend to create less loan loss provisions during boom times 
and increase provisions during economic downturns (Bikker & Metzemakers, 2005). LOANS as 
an independent variable related to the banks characteristics are sensitive to macroeconomic 
situation in the country. As a rule, if banks do not implement counter-cyclical procedures in their 
activity, loan volumes grow during upturns due to favorable conditions for repayments by the 
borrowers and decreases during downturns, which lead to a further worsening of the countries 
economic situation (Gonzales, 2009). Therefore relationships between loan loss provisions and 
loans to assets ratio in our model are expected to be negative in order to confirm the pro-
cyclicality hypothesis.  
The dummy variable aims to show how provisioning behavior changes during crisis. In this 
regard taking into account that the crisis was not met by the CIS countries simultaneously we 
cannot implement the time dummy variable and therefore we consider negative GDP as the sign 
of crisis. Hence GDP growth is marked as 1 if it is negative otherwise it is 0.   
Apart from the above mentioned variables we have included one additional independent variable 
for testing the pro-cyclicality hypothesis which we believe explains the peculiarity of CIS banks. 
It is DEBT which refers to external bank debt. Since external bank debt grew significantly in CIS 
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countries during their economic upturns (Chapter 2), this independent variable can be associated 
with the regions’ business cycle. Therefore for confirmation of the pro-cyclicality hypothesis we 
expect a negative correlation between DEBT and loan loss provisions. 
Income smoothing hypothesis 
EBTP is an independent variable which has been included in the model for testing the income 
smoothing hypothesis. Loan loss provisions are created by the means of bank’s expenses 
therefore any increase of loan loss provisions influences the bank’s earnings (UPLIFT, 2001). 
Because of the interrelation of loan loss provisions with earnings and a judgmental element 
existing in the process of creating loan loss provisions, income smoothing is used by bank 
managers in order to manage the volatility of banks’ profit (Yunxia,2007). Therefore we expect a 
positive correlation between earnings before taxes and provisions (EBTP) and loan loss 
provisions. 
Capital management hypothesis 
Bikker & Metzemakers (2005) in their research use capital ratio to test the capital management 
hypothesis. They conclude that banks with low capital ratios tend to create more provisions. 
Following their survey we also use the same independent variable CAP in our model. Hence we 
expect negative correlation between CAP and LLP as confirmation of capital management.   
Lagged dependent variable 
Following the example of Bouvatier & Lepetit (2008) we have included in our models lagged 
dependent variables in order to take into account of the ‘dynamic adjustment of LLPit’ 
(Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008, p.518) . This variable is aimed to reflect the speed of LLP changes 
over time as reaction on the deterioration of loan portfolio’s quality. (Floro,2010).  If LLP 
correlates with the lagged dependent variable then the speed of LLP adjustment is slow, 
therefore no correlation is expected between the variables in cases where the LLP has been 
reached in the same period as potential losses are recognized.  
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Since we have included lagged dependent variables in our model the usage of ordinary least 
square method could lead to biased results therefore we apply the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) which is used for dynamic panel data regression. For estimation of regression 
we follow the example of Laeven & Majnoni (2003) and use ‘Arellano and Bond GMM 
difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent variables’ (Laeven & Majnoni, 
2003,p.193).  According to Mileva (2007) Arellano and Bond GMM estimator is able to solve 
several problems which may arise in dynamic panel data regression. The first problem is the 
correlation of regressors with error terms because of the presence of endogenous explanatory 
variables in the regression equation. Second, the problem of autocorrelation due to the inclusion 
of lagged dependent variables. The third problem relates to the panel data base with short time 
dimension (t=7) in comparison with the larger bank dimension (i=64).  
3.2. The data 
For analysis we use data from sixty four Kazakh, Russian and Ukrainian banks. The biggest 
sample of forty one banks belongs to Russia the smallest one includes eight Kazakh banks and 
the rest twenty five banks from the Ukrainian sample. All banks which were included in the 
dataset are commercial banks constituting the second tier of the CIS banking system. The 
Russian dataset includes several state banks, however it is worth noting that state banks which 
are not under government control also belong to second tier banks. (Doronkin et al, 2011). 
Overall my dataset is homogenous since it only represents commercial banks (Bikker and 
Metzemakers, 2005) We use a 7 year period from 2004 to 2010 which includes both the period 
of economic growth and slowdown caused by the global crisis and should be helpful in testing 
pro-cyclicality effects of provisions on the countries’ economies. The source used for collecting 
bank data is Bankscope database; macroeconomic figures are obtained from IMF websites and 
statistical agencies from each country.  
In order to create a more balanced dataset for regression analysis we excluded banks with 
insufficient data and initial list of banks decreased from 181 to 64 banks. However in some cases 
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Bankscope dataset program has not provided information for 2010 figures therefore we use IFRS 
based annual financial reporting for 2010  from banks’ websites where it was possible to obtain 
it.     
Table 20. Descriptive statistics of key regression variables 
     Variables  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
LLP/TA 0.026 0.053 (-0.082) 0.498 
CAP/TA 0.118 0.102 (-1.254) 0.359 
LOANS/TA 0.639 0.362 0.062 7.601 
EBTP/TA 0.036 0.067 (-0.432) 0.782 
GDP growth 0.044 0.059 (-0.151) 0.121 
UNEMPL rate 0.072 0.008 0.058 0.088 
LnDebt (-0.691) 1.126 (-3.765) 0.508 
 
Source: Stata 11. 
 
    From Table 20 with descriptive statistics of key regression variables we can summarize that 
GDP growth during the period of consideration among CIS countries was 4.4% on average and 
unemployment rates averaged equaled 7.2 %. However the minimum level of GDP growth was 
negative and equal to -15.1 % and the maximum unemployment rate was 8.8%.  Loan loss 
provisions to total assets grew from -0.082 to 0.498 while on average it was 0.026. The 
minimum of capital ratio was equivalent to – 1.254 which was the consequence of bankruptcy of 
several banks (Chapter 2) and the maximum level reached 0.359 and on average capital ratios 
equaled 0.118.   The highest difference between minimum and maximum levels was reached by 
loans to total assets ratio, which increased from 0.062 to 7.601. Earnings before taxes and 
provisions to total assets averaged 0.036 but the minimum index was negative at -0.432 and the 
maximum level reached 0.782. The only variable, natural logarithm of external bank debt, had 
negative signs for the average parameter -0.691, the highest level equaled 0.508 and the lowest 
level equaled -3.765 implying that during period of consideration banks tended to repay their 
external debts (Chapter 2). One of reasons for the significant decrease of loans to total assets 
ratio to my mind was repayment of external debts by the banks in the deteriorating quality of 
loan portfolio’s. 
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CHAPTER 4: Empirical results 
Table 21. Regression results 
Regression variables                        Coefficient                                           p-value  
LLP, lagged (-0.296) 0.004 
 
CAP (-0.298) 0.016 
LOANS 0.037 0.000 
EBTP (-0.101) 0.318 
GDP (-0.483) 0.000 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.975 0.008 
DUM_VAR (-0.043) 0.008 
DEBT 0.013 0.004 
   Source: Stata 11 
Table 21 contains results of dynamic panel data regression. Coefficients for lagged LLP, CAP, 
LOANS, GDP, UNEMPLOYMENT, DEBT and DUM_VAR variables are significant taking 
into account that their p value is less than chosen significance level of 0.05. Therefore we can 
reject the null hypothesis and state that there is a correlation between dependent and the above 
mentioned independent variables. Coefficients for independent variables, EBTP, and for constant 
are insignificant.  Country variables are omitted by the regression model due to their 
multicollinearity which might be caused, to my mind, by the similarity of Kazakh, Russian and 
Ukrainian economies since all of them were part of the USSR in the past. 
According to the regression results confirmation of the pro-cyclicality hypothesis is found. 
Namely the predicted correlation between GDP growth and LLP is negative. This result is 
consistent with Bikker & Metzemakers (2005), Bouvatier & Lepetit (2008) and Laeven & 
Majnoni’s (2003) findings. GDP variable coefficients are significant and equal – 0.48. (Table 
21). Therefore we conclude that CIS banks increase the level of loan loss provisions when GDP 
growth goes down and vice versa. 
UNEMPLOYMENT also reflects the business cycle and is positively correlated with loan loss 
provisions therefore confirming the pro-cyclicality hypothesis. The coefficient of 
UNEMPLOYMENT variable is significant at 0.98 (Table 21). Thus increased unemployment 
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leads to increased loan loss provisions. Our result does not correspond to Bikker & 
Metzemakers’ (2005) research which did not find statistically significant relationships between 
unemployment rate and loan loss provisions.  
Thus we observe that GDP and unemployment relate to loan loss provisions and find that the 
relationship has a pro-cyclical effect on the economies of the three countries. It is worth noting 
that in absolute values the coefficient for UNEMPLOYMENT (0.98) is larger than the 
coefficient for GDP ( 0.48) implying that the unemployment rate’s change results in larger 
adjustments of bank provisions than in the case of GDP growth changes. This can be explained 
by the peculiarity of CIS banks provisioning system. Namely, according to the rules of loans’ 
classification of each country the quality of collateral under extended credit plays an important 
role determining the size of loan loss provisioning. This means that the more liquid collateral the 
less provisions are required since banks in case of problem loans can return the loan amount 
through the collateral selling. For example, in Russia the size of loan loss provisions for overdue 
consumer loans without any collateral should be double that of mortgage and auto credits (Table 
13). Relationships between loan loss provisions and the unemployment rate relate to a greater 
extent to consumer lending. Therefore when the unemployment rate rises more people lose their 
jobs and are unable to repay their loans. This leads banks to increase their loan loss provisions 
significantly under uncollateralized loans. Moreover deteriorating economic situations leads to 
unemployment and an increase of problem loans in banks which in its turn limits the 
populations’ access to consumer credit. All of these factors decrease demand for purchase of 
houses which finally leads to falling prices in housing markets. (Doronkin et al, 2011) 
Consequently mortgage loans also become the subject of provisions’ increase because of the 
decreased value of collateral. The same scenario with consumer loans took place in Kazakhstan 
(FSA,2009) and Ukraine(Kirchner et al, 2011). Moreover in Ukraine consumer loans growth was 
the highest among other CIS countries with ‘average yearly increase of 104%’ during the period 
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from 2004 to 2008 (Kirchner et al, 2011, p.11). Thus it could be the reason for the larger impact 
of unemployment rates on the growth of loan loss provisions than GDP. 
Dummy variables aim to reflect adjustment of provisions during crisis and non-crisis periods. Its 
coefficient is significant, equals -0,043 (Table 21). Negative signs of the variables coefficient 
means that during bad time banks create loan loss provisions more than during good times.   This 
result supports the hypothesis of the pro-cyclical provisioning behaviour of CIS banks. 
The coefficient for LOANS is statistically significant and equals to 0.037 (Table 21). Positive 
correlation between loans to total assets and loan loss provisions to total asset ratios implies that 
increase (decrease) of LOANS leads to the increase (decrease) of loan loss provisions. A positive 
sign for this independent variable rejects the pro-cyclicality hypothesis and hence is consistent 
with findings of Bikker & Metzemakers (2005), Floro (2010). However, following Bikker & 
Metzemakers’ (2005) research, we can conclude that taking into account higher coefficients for 
GDP and UNEMPLOYMENT variables than for LOANS variable, overall CIS banks 
provisioning behavior has a pro-cyclical effect on the country’s economies. Therefore the 
relationships between LOANS and LLP only diminish pro-cyclical effect of bank provisioning 
behavior in CIS countries. 
The reason for such results may be another peculiarity of CIS banks provisioning systems.  
According to the rules for the creation of loan loss provisions banks are required to form loan 
loss provisions under a standard category of loans which includes loans without any overdue 
repayments. This type of provision constitutes general loan loss provisions (Chapter 2). For 
example, in Russia banks have to create loan loss provisions for homogenous group of loans 
which belongs to the category ‘without overdue repayment’ at the rate of between 0.50% and 
1.50% of the principal amount (Table 13) and in Ukraine banks must create loan loss provisions 
for loans from the standard category at 2% of the principal loan amount (Table 18). In 
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Kazakhstan banks can create loan loss provisions for the standard category of loans at their own 
discretion.      
This result does not directly support Hsieh et al’s (2008) research that income smoothing is more 
likely can be found in countries where regulation fixes the minimum level of loan loss provisions 
for standard loans. However in the sense that such regulation requirements makes loan loss 
provisioning behavior less pro-cyclical, our results correspond to some extent to their 
conclusions. A World Bank survey (2003) also states that such loan loss provisioning practice is 
counter-cyclical since it relates to the forward looking approach.   
The DEBT variable relates to the banks external debt. The coefficient for DEBT is significant, 
and equals 0.013 (Table 21) and has positive signs. This means that an increase of the banks 
external debt increases loan loss provisions. The received outcome rejects the pro-cyclical 
hypothesis and to the contrary documents signs of counter-cyclicality. However as in the case of 
LOANS it does not significantly influence the overall pro-cyclical effect of bank provisioning in 
CIS which has been confirmed by GDP and UNEMPLOYMENT variables and therefore to some 
extent only mitigates the pro-cyclicality of provisioning. This variable relates to LOANS since 
bank external debt aims to increase the funding base of banks therefore leading to the loans 
growth. As discussed above most banks must create loan loss provisions for the loans which do 
not have signs of non-repayment hence we see the same tendency of a positive correlation 
between LLP and DEBT as it is between LLP and LOANS.  We also assume that this counter-
cyclical effect of external bank debt on loan loss provisions may exist because any external debt 
implies relationships with investors. Banks which are willing to borrow funds from abroad have 
to convince foreign investors that invested money will be repaid in time. Therefore creation of 
general loan loss provisions as a cushion for unpredictable loan losses could be a sign of good 
credit risk management for investors.     
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The regression outcome shows insignificant result for EBTP therefore there is no correlation 
between loan loss provisions and earnings before taxes and provisions.  Hence we do not find 
evidence of the income smoothing hypothesis. This means that taking into account negative sign 
of the variable’s coefficient when earnings before taxes and provisions go down loan loss 
provisions go up but in this case LLP change does not significantly depend on the change of 
EBTP. Therefore we can conclude that CIS banks are less concerned about profits volatility or in 
other words they do not have serious incentives to use earning management since a substantial 
proportion of banks do not have sufficient opportunities to use global capital markets where 
profit stability is an important sign of the bank’ s stability.  The evidence of limited access of 
CIS banks to global capital markets could be the modest number of IPOs made by CIS banks. 
For example as of 2007 in the list of banks which accomplished IPO there were no Ukrainian 
banks, only three Kazakh banks (Dzhalilova, 2007) and two Russian banks (Buzdalin, 2007).    
 Coefficient for the explanatory variable CAP is significant at -0.298 (Table 21). Hence we have 
evidence of a negative correlation between capital ratio and loan loss provisions which confirms 
the capital management hypothesis. This negative relationship implies that banks increase their 
general loan loss provisions if they are part of tier 2 capital, when Tier 1 capital ratio is low 
Bikker & Metzemakers (2005). This result is in consistent with Bikker & Metzemakers (2005) 
results. However they assume that the same negative correlation between CAP and LLP could be 
the result of an increased amount of bad loans and low capital ratio. In Graph 1 we can see that 
overall capital ratio and loan loss provisions move in opposite directions corresponding to our 
regression results that imply that banks increase (decrease) their loan loss provisions when 
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Graph 2. Capital ratio and LLP/TA (CIS banks) 
 
Floro’s (2010) research is based on a survey of Philippine banks which by the peculiarity of loan 
loss provisioning regulation are quite similar to Russian and Ukrainian banks. Namely, in all 
those countries banks are obliged by the regulation to create loan loss provisions for unclassified 
category of loans which form general provisions and should be counted as part of Tier 2 capital.  
Therefore our results between LOANS and LLP correspond to results gained by Floro (2010) for 
Philippine banks. Floro (2010) also documents a negative correlation between CAP and LLP 
which is consistent with our results that despite the fact that general provisions are created during 
upturns they therefore can be used as buffer during bad times. However our sample also includes 
Kazakh banks which are not obliged to create general loan loss provisions for standard loans but 
they can do so at their own discretion. General loan loss provisions are also part of Tier 2 capital 
in Kazakhstan.  
In the case of Russian and Ukrainian banks the creation of general provisions is a less 
discretional process than in the case of Kazakhstan. This means that such regulation leaves fewer 
opportunities for Russian and Ukrainian banks to manipulate with capital ratio through general 
loan loss provisions. However in Russia for non-homogenous loans the rules do not prescribe the 
creation of loan loss provisions for the standard category of loans and in Kazakhstan banks can 
create general loan loss provisions at their own discretion. Therefore taking into account that 
general provisions form part of regulatory capital we assume that CIS banks may have incentives 
to use general provisions for improvement of capital ratio deteriorated due to the increase of bad 
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Tier 2 capital is limited by the capital regulation up to 1.25% of the risk weighted assets (Chapter 
2), the increase of general provisions for capital management cannot be an everlasting process 
for the purposes of capital ratio improvement (Zhou Yunxia, 2007). Therefore general loan loss 
provisions are not the only source for capital management among CIS banks.  
The negative correlation between CAP and LLP as mentioned above could be also caused by the 
worsening quality of bank’s loan portfolio which leads the banks to create more specific loan 
loss provisions and results in decreased capital ratio. Therefore capital ratio and loan loss 
provisions go in opposite directions. We can see such dynamics on all three graphs for each 
country graph (Graph 3, Graph 4, Graph 5).  However there could be another explanation for the 
negative relationship between CAP and LLP. When banks reach the critical level of capital ratio 
they start to manipulate specific loan loss provisions in order to decrease them and improve the 
level of capital ratio. Since banks can estimate the level of riskiness of the borrower at their 
discretion capital management can take place.  However the governments of Kazakhstan 
(Saenko, 2010) and Russia (Doronkin et al, 2011) being concerned by the deteriorating capital 
adequacy of banks and significant decreases of lending levels made capital injections in some 
system forming banks. Ukrainian banks with foreign capital participation were supported by 
their parent banks 1 (Kirchner et al, 2011). At the same time banks are also concerned with the 
increased quantity of bad loans apply for restructuring of bad loans which in turn influenced, to 
some extent, the decrease of specific loan loss provisions (Gribanova,2009). Therefore capital 
ratio improves simultaneously with the decrease of loan loss provisions and we observe negative 




                                                             
1 As of 2011 40.4 % of total banks capital in Ukraine belongs to foreign investors (Kirchner et al, 2011). 
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Graph 3. Capital ratio and LLP/TA (Kazakh banks) 
 
Graph 4. Capital ratio and LLP/TA (Ukrainian banks) 
 
Graph 5. Capital ratio and LLP/TA (Russian banks) 
 
From Graphs 3, 4 and 5 we can see that Kazakhstani banks show the most vivid evidence of 
negative co-movement of capital ratio and loan loss provisions. This could be explained by the 
fact that the three system forming banks were near to bankruptcy which led the banks to create a 
significant level of specific loan loss provisions in the conditions of decreasing capital 
(Saenko,2010). In the case of other Kazakhstani banks we assume that they may use general loan 
loss provisions to improve their capital ratios.   
In this regard we think that we have indicated a negative correlation between CAP and LLP for 
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some banks; increase of specific loan loss provisions because of increased bad loans for other 
banks; decrease of specific loan loss provisions because of increased number of restructured 
loans and improvement of capital ratios due to government support and injections of additional 
capital to the capital of foreign banks’ subsidiaries by their head offices. 
Lagged dependent variables are significant meaning that loan loss provisions are adjusted by CIS 
banks gradually (Bouvatier &Lepetit, 2008).  Surprisingly, the sign for lagged dependent 
variable is negative which is the opposite of Laeven & Majnoni (2003) and Bouvatier &Lepetit 
(2008) research findings. A negative correlation between LLP and LLPi,t-1 implies that loan loss 
provisioning starts to grow as a reaction for identified losses while by the next period their level 
decreases and all these adjustments reflect a deterioration of the loans quality determined in the 
previous period. We can see this dynamic of loan loss provisions change for all three countries 
separately on Graph 6 and the common trend on Graph 7. 
Graph 6. LLP/TA of Kazakh, Ukrainian and Russian banks.
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We suggest that the reason for CIS banks results could be restructuring of debt which leads to the 
decrease of specific loan loss provisions due to changing the loan’s risk classification category to 
an improved one. According to Batalova (2010) in 2008 the Central Bank of Russia implemented 
the special regulation for restructured loans. According to this regulation in case the loan has 
been recognized as restructured loan, banks are not obliged to lower the classification category 
of loan and therefore create additional capital. Besides she argues that it is better for banks to 
transfer loans from non-standard to restructured loans rather than to return the loan amount after 
the company announced its bankruptcy since in such cases a bank will be able to retrieve only 
about 30-50% of the principal amount. Gribanova (2009) expresses the same point of view in 
relation to Kazakhstan stating that because of an increase of bad loans and provisions, banks 
capital decreases, therefore banks tend to increase the number of restructured loans. Even if 
restructured loans are still subject to the creation of provisions the rate of provisioning is lower 
than in the case of bad loans.     
Conclusion  
In this paper we have aimed to test whether loan loss provisioning systems of CIS banks are pro-
cyclical. The overall results provide evidence that CIS banks increase their provisions during bad 
times and decrease them during upturns. This outcome is consistent with the most part of the 
findings made in the reviewed literature. Confirmation of the pro-cyclicality hypothesis has been 
an expected outcome of our testing since regulation of CIS banks has the capacity for bank 
discretional actions and accounting standards to a greater extent is based on the backward 
looking approach.  
However we have also documented signs of counter-cyclical provisioning behaviour. Namely 
loan loss provisions increase together with loans growth. We have explained such results by the 
peculiarity of provisioning regulation in Russia and Ukraine. It relates to the requirement to 
create provisions for standard loans. The test’s results have shown that positive correlation 
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between loan loss provisions and loans to total assets ratio can only mitigate the overall pro-
cyclical effect of the loan loss provisions but cannot overcome it.  
The income-smoothing hypothesis has not been confirmed for CIS banks implying that CIS 
banks do not use loan loss provisions to smooth their earnings. This result is in strict opposition 
to the findings of much existing researches. We have explained this phenomenon by the fact that 
only a few CIS banks have access to the global capital markets therefore, in general, CIS banks 
are not interested in smoothing the volatility of their earnings. We think that this outcome is not 
surprising since we have mentioned before that CIS banking systems are quite young and still in 
the process of integration to the global market.  
The capital management hypothesis is confirmed, namely we have documented a negative 
correlation between capital ratio and loan loss provisions. According to the empirical research 
which was devoted to the testing and explanation of the capital management hypothesis and was 
described by us in Chapter One, the current findings could be the result of the loan loss 
provisions increasing when capital ratios are low implying that banks manipulate general loan 
loss provisions in order to improve capital ratios. However taking into account the fact that 
regulation in Ukraine and partially in Russia leaves less discretion in creating general loan loss 
provisions we conclude that general loan loss provisions could not be the only source of the 
capital management. Indeed, we have found out that CIS banks are concerned with decreasing  
bank capital because of the increased number of bad loans, which started to increase the number 
of restructured loans leading to a fall in loan loss provisions and therefore improvement of the 
capital ratio. At the same time the capital of CIS banks has been supported by the government 
and foreign banks which have their subsidiaries in CIS through the additional capital injections. 
Such support was aimed at strengthening banks capital. In addition we assume that banks also 
tend to underestimate the level of specific loan loss provisions taking into account that loan 
classification procedures are discretional actions in all three countries. Finally all the above 
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
57 
 
mentioned actions increase the banks’ capital ratio and diminish the level of the loan loss 
provisions.  
Therefore taking into consideration the empirical results of our research we can document that 
we have found confirmation of pro-cyclicality and capital management hypotheses but 
discovered no evidence of income-smoothing among CIS banks. However the lack of income-
smoothing among CIS banks is a question of time and  as soon as a number of banks completed 
IPO has increased, further research may find positive correlations between earnings before taxes 
and provisions and loan loss provisions. The reason for this is that bank regulations of CIS 
countries to some extent create opportunities for bank discretional actions in creating loan loss 
provisions. Therefore even if income-smoothing according to Bikker & Metzemakers (2005) can 
have mitigating effects on the pro-cyclicality of provisions it is still a measure which manages to 
hide the true picture of the banks financial position and therefore in this sense is far from the idea 
of dynamic provisioning system which can strengthen the financial stability of the bank.  
While the process of provisioning contains judgmental element banks managers will manipulate 
provisions to satisfy their own needs.  
Based on the conclusions of the existing empirical research we can conclude that counter-
cyclical bank provisioning behaviour implies appropriate provisioning regulation leaving less 
opportunities for discretional actions by the bank mangers and the forward looking approach for 
credit risk assessment leading to the creation of provisions that can accumulate buffer funds 
during good times in order to use them during downturns. 
Therefore we would recommend to all three CIS countries improvement of their provisioning 
systems in the above named directions.  
Kazakhstan is on its way to implementing some core principles of Basel III in order to overcome 
pro-cyclical requirement for banks embedded in Basel II. By 2013 Kazakhstan is planning to 
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implement dynamic reserves and change capital requirements by including in calculation of 
capital ratios buffer capitals meaning that creation of a cushion for possible poor economic 
conditions will be required by the bank regulation.(FSA, press-release N.239)   
As we have already mentioned before, Russia for homogenous group of standard loans and 
Ukraine for all types of standard loans have fixed the minimum size of general loan loss 
provisions. This requirement is aimed at the creation of buffer funds for bad times. Therefore we 
would recommend for Russian banks also create loan loss provisions also for non-homogenous 
loans.   
All three countries have rules for creation of loan loss provisions nevertheless we assume that 
there are still possibilities for discretional actions. For example, according to World Bank (2003) 
collateral in Russia is also used to determine the loans risk category and in this regard bank 
manager can determine the loan as secured even if it is unsecured. Besides, in Kazakhstan at 
present creation of general loan loss provisions is a discretional action implying that banks can 
create such provisions at their own discretion.  Therefore we think that more detailed 
provisioning regulation could be helpful in improvement of loan loss provisioning behaviour 
from pro-cyclical to counter-cyclical.  
However it is worth to remembering that CIS countries’ economies are not yet mature with less 
developed stock exchange markets and real sectors meaning that the banking sector is important 
one for further development of the countries. In this regard any changes in bank regulation aimed 
to implement counter-cyclical provisioning rules may lead to the an increase of banking costs 
and ultimately to the decreased levels of lending. Hence we recommend that CIS banks to 
implement balanced provisioning systems which will take into consideration all factors which 
follow after the proposed improvements.  
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APPENDIX 1:  
Descriptive statistics of key regression variables. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  log:  I:\dissertation data\Regression data\1408_1.log 
  log type:  text 
  opened on:  14 Aug 2011, 14:41:29 
. use "I:\dissertation data\Regression data\1408.dta", clear 
. summarize LLP l.LLP  Equity Loans Profit GDP Unempl Dum_var LNdebt, separator(0) 
    Variable        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         LLP  
         --.          448    .0260872    .0537556  -.0826396   .4987237 
         L1.        384    .0262578    .0561219  -.0826396   .4987237 
             
      Equity       448    .1181972    .1023081  -1.254542   .3593823 
       Loans       448    .6398984    .3622852    .062618   7.601308 
       Profit        448    .0365006    .0672638  -.4328313   .7821481 
       GDP         448    .0447321     .059915      -.151       .121 
       Unempl     448    .0728638    .0083327       .058       .088 
       Dum_var   448        .125        .3310886          0          1 
       LNdebt     448   -.6911263    1.126262  -3.765847   .5080217 
  
. log close 
  name:  <unnamed> 
  log:  I:\dissertation data\Regression data\1408_1.log 
  log type:  text 
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APPENDIX 2:  
Regression results. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
name:  <unnamed> 
log:  I:\dissertation data\Regression data\1908_1.log 
log type:  text 
opened on:  19 Aug 2011, 00:22:47 
. xtset Bank Year 
 panel variable:  Bank (strongly balanced) 
 time variable:  Year, 2004 to 2010 
 delta:  1 unit 
. xtabond LLP Equity Loans Profit GDP Unempl Dum_var LNdebt, lags(1) twostep vce(robust) 
artests(2) 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       320 
Group variable: Bank                         Number of groups      =        64 
Time variable: Year 
Obs per group:    min =         5 
                            avg =         5 
                            max =         5 
 
Number of instruments =     23               Wald chi2(8)          =   1007.52 
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000 
Two-step results 
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on Bank) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                         WC-Robust 
         LLP       Coef.         Std. Err.      z    P>|z|          [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         LLP  
         L1.    -.2965529        .1038176    -2.86   0.004    -.5000317   -.0930742              
      Equity   -.2985975      .1239758    -2.41   0.016    -.5415856   -.0556093 
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       Loans    .0373266       .0033328    11.20   0.000     .0307943    .0438588 
      Profit     -.1012837       .1014258    -1.00   0.318    -.3000746    .0975072 
         GDP    -.4836829      .1278647    -3.78   0.000    -.7342931   -.2330728 
      Unempl    .9759108     .3707467     2.63   0.008     .2492607    1.702561 
     Dum_var   -.0435977   .0163214    -2.67   0.008    -.0755871   -.0116083 
      LNdebt     .0128709    .0044815     2.87   0.004     .0040873    .0216545 
       _cons       .0055364     .0185992     0.30   0.766    -.0309174    .0419902 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instruments for differenced equation 
        GMM-type: L(2/.).LLP 
        Standard: D.Equity D.Loans D.Profit D.GDP D.Unempl D.Dum_var D.LNdebt 
Instruments for level equation 
        Standard: _cons 
. estat abond 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors 
 Order      z       Prob > z 
     1    -1.9689    0.0490  
     2  -.28582     0.7750  
   H0: no autocorrelation  
. log close 
      name:  <unnamed> 
       log:  I:\dissertation data\Regression data\1908_1.log 
  log type:  text 
 closed on:  19 Aug 2011, 00:23:38 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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